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Fictional Objects within the 
Theory of Mental Files: Problems 
and Prospects
Zoltán Vecsey
A recent version of the mental file framework argues that the antirealist theory of fictional objects can 
be reconciled with the claim that fictional utterances involving character names express propositions 
that are true in the real world. This hybrid view rests on the following three claims: (i) character names 
lack referents but express a  mode of presentation, (ii) fictional utterances introduce oblique contexts 
where character names refer to their modes of presentation, and (iii) modes of presentation are mental 
files. In this critical paper, I  will argue that the proposed view runs into a  number of theory-internal 
problems. These problems arise partly from the unclarities inherent in the notion of mental file, and 
partly from a  mistaken semantics for character names. I  will also argue that adherents of fictional 
realism can make use of the notion of mental file without encountering similar difficulties.  |  Keywords: 
Antirealism, Fictional Objects, Mental Files, Character Names, Reference, Representation
1 Fictional Objects in the Mental File Framework
The technical notion ‘mental file’ has been used recently by philosophers of 
language and theoretical linguists to explain the nature of singular thought 
and reference in natural language. Although there is no general consensus 
concerning the explanatory function of this term, it is widely agreed that the 
primary role of mental files is to store and manage information and, 
occasionally, misinformation about the objects we are somehow acquainted 
with. For example, Recanati (2012), a  leading theorist of this approach, 
assumes that we can gain information/misinformation from a particular object 
when we stand in an epistemically rewarding relation to it. Sensory perception 
is the paradigm case of this kind of information gathering. We become aware of 
our immediate external environment by seeing or otherwise perceiving the 
sensory features of particulars. Acquaintance relations are usually interpreted 
normatively rather than logically or metaphysically in this area of research. We 
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1 More precisely, antirealists are in agreement concerning the generic structure of the 
explanation, but they offer different versions of it. For example, see the works of Friend (2011, 
2014) and Salis (2013). 
2 The first occurrence of this idea is to be found in Walton (1990).
open a mental file when there is an appropriate information channel between 
us and the object the file is about. This can be taken to be the normal or default 
situation. But it is not necessary (either logically or metaphysically) that there 
actually be such an information channel. Information gathering seems possible 
even in cases where acquaintance is merely imagined or simulated. Future-
directed discourse is a  good case in point. Our talk about the future is often 
based on acts of imagination. We have a  natural inclination to make 
statements about future objects as if they were real existents in the world. In 
the broad sense of the term, we can thus specify objects that do  not actually 
exist. We can attach proper names to “them”, share our ideas about “them” and 
so  forth. Imagination provides us with pieces of information that can be 
mentally stored in the usual manner. These and similar cases indicate that 
under certain circumstances mental files may be opened even in the absence of 
genuine epistemically rewarding relations.
This latter putative feature is what makes the notion of ‘mental file’ 
so attractive to theories of fictional objects. If we can indeed store and manage 
information/misinformation about purported objects in mental files without 
being actually acquainted with these purported objects, then by relying on this 
notion, we may try to give an account of how we can think of and talk about 
fictional persons and events.
Take for example the character of Sherlock Holmes in Conan Doyle’s detective 
novel, A Study in Scarlet. Holmes is portrayed in the novel as being a detective. 
It is easy to check that Conan Doyle uses the proper name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in 
his story consistently as if it were a genuinely referring singular expression. Yet 
we know that there is no such detective in the real world, external to the story. 
So  regarding its semantic status, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a  non-referring name. 
Given these two facts –that the main protagonist of Conan Doyle’s novel is not 
a real person, and that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does not refer to anything– it seems 
puzzling that we can gather so many pieces of information “about” Holmes and 
his deeds. We know very well that “he” is an outstanding detective, that “he” is 
a pipe-smoker, that “he” lives at 221B Baker Street, London, etc. Intuitively it 
seems we are able to think many singular thoughts involving these pieces of 
information. And it seems, again intuitively, that by expressing these thoughts 
we are able to make a  potentially unlimited number of meaningful singular 
statements about the protagonist of the novel. How is this possible?
It is not easy to resolve this many-layered puzzle but it appears to be a good 
initial step to reflect on the way we collect information and misinformation 
about such fictional objects as Holmes. Adherents of the antirealist approach to 
fiction have recently offered an elegant and at first sight plausible explanation 
for this process.1 The basic idea of this explanation is that, from the point of 
view of readers, fictional works should be conceived as prescriptions to 
imagine.2 Novels and short stories prescribe us to imagine that things are 
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a certain way. In order to understand and appreciate a fictional work properly, 
we should follow as closely as possible the prescriptions originating from the 
narrative of that work. If the narrative tells us explicitly that there is 
a detective who smokes the pipe, lives at 221B Baker Street, London, etc., then 
we should imagine that there really is a  detective who has exactly these 
properties. And if the narrative contains occurrences of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in 
referring positions, then we should imagine that tokens of this name really 
refer to a  person. Imagination does not require that we be committed to 
fictional objects; it requires merely that we be committed to pieces of 
information (and possibly misinformation) that can be extracted from the 
relevant narratives. 
Given this basic idea, it is surely a  well-motivated theoretical move to argue 
that this kind of information should be thought of as being collected in mental 
files. Antirealists who sympathize with the mental file conception of singular 
thought are obliged to say something about the nature of files. The common 
view, again originating from Recanati, is that a mental file usually consists of 
three components: the file itself with a certain label, the informational content 
of the file, and the reference-fixing relation that determines which object the 
file is about. As we have seen, when our targets are fictional works, the last 
component cannot be a  genuine epistemic relation to an object external to 
a  given narrative. But this does not generate a  serious problem for the view. 
Thanks to our imaginative activities, labelled files can be opened and can be 
filled with pieces of information without the presence of external anchors. We 
can proceed broadly in the following manner. In reading the novel A Study in 
Scarlet, we encounter the character name ‘Sherlock Holmes’. As a  reaction to 
this reading experience, we open a  mental file labelled with ‘HOLMES’. All of 
the Holmes-relevant information that we can extract from the text of the novel 
will then be collected in the HOLMES file. We know, however, that our mental 
activities are governed in this process by the rules of imagination. And 
therefore we also know that when we deploy our HOLMES file we can refer only 
to an imagined person. According to the antirealist picture, this is why and how 
we can generate mental files on fictional characters and events with which we 
cannot, in principle, be acquainted. 
Now the question arises whether the basic idea of this type of mental file 
theory is tenable or not. It is important to keep in mind that most adherents of 
the antirealist approach are convinced that fictional objects do  not exist. On 
their view, there is simply no such fictional character as Holmes. But can such 
an allegedly nonexistent character be accounted for in terms of mental files?3 
In my own view, the short answer to this question is no. More cautiously, my 
claim is that we have good reasons to be skeptical concerning the explanatory 
power of the antirealists’ mental file framework.
In what follows, I will focus my critical attention on the most recent version of 
the framework, elaborated and defended by Orlando (2017). Orlando’s 
conception deserves attention for two reasons. First, the proposed framework is 
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sufficiently general for being a  target of criticism. Second, Orlando 
supplements the standard conception of mental files with a  semantic theory 
that gives a  new twist to the ongoing debate about the interpretation of 
fictional statements. In Section 2, I  briefly outline the main elements of 
Orlando’s antirealist proposal. In Section 3, I try to point out that the proposed 
framework suffers from serious internal problems. Finally, in Section 4 I try to 
show that the notion of mental file is much less problematic when applied 
within the boundaries of a  realist theorywhich acknowledges the existence of 
fictional objects.
2 Extending the Framework with a Two-Level Semantics
According to the mental file doctrine, if someone becomes acquainted with the 
novelist Jonathan Franzen, they open a  file labelled with the mental name 
FRANZEN, and henceforth store or delete information/misinformation about 
Franzen exclusively in this very file. That is, they possess the individual file 
about Franzen, labelled with the mental name FRANZEN, and filled with 
descriptive concepts like ‘born in Illinois’, ‘author of The Corrections’, ‘wearing 
spectacles’, etc. Of course, different instances of the FRANZEN file may contain 
different sets of descriptive concepts. There might be readers who recognize 
Franzen as the ‘author of The Corrections’, others might know him as the 
‘author of Purity’. Differences in descriptive content do not affect the identity 
of the FRANZEN file, though. Competent readers will share the same file type 
because instances of this type ought to be individuated in the same way (i.e. by 
being related causally to Franzen) in every case.
Readers will be in a position to entertain singular thoughts about Franzen just 
in case they possess an instance of the FRANZEN file type. This is nearly self-
evident. Yet it is not entirely obvious how mental files can be involved in 
expressing singular propositions about this person. The proposed explanation is 
that mental files should be thought of as devices of (mental) reference which 
are capable to refer to persons in roughly the same way as singular expressions 
refer in natural language. On this account, files are mental counterparts of 
proper names and, importantly, are supposed to be counterparts in the 
semantic sense of the word. If this is so, an utterance of the statement ‘Franzen 
is the author of The Corrections’ can express a  mental or conceptual 
proposition about Franzen on the basis of the referential capacity of the 
FRANZEN file. Like its natural language counterpart, the expressed proposition 
counts as singular, since the FRANZEN file is grounded on causal relations to 
Franzen in roughly the same way as the proper name ‘Franzen’ is grounded 
causally on Franzen. 
Orlando (2017, pp. 57–58) claims, on this basis, that mental files can be 
regarded as a  constitutive component of the semantic content of singular 
utterances. This has already been recognized in the relevant literature. 
Recanati and many others have repeatedly argued that files play the role of 
non-descriptive Fregean modes of presentation. Seen from a  semantic 
perspective, files as (non-descriptive) modes of presentation perform 
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parafictive, and metafictive utterances, Thomasson (2003) uses the technical terms 
‘fictionalizing discourse’, ‘internal discourse’, and ‘external discourse’.
5 We can make a  further distinction here between implicit parafictive utterances like (3) and 
explicit parafictive uttereances. The latter type uses prefixes such as ‘In work W’ or ‘According 
to the story S’. For present purposes, this distinction is irrelevant.
a  complex function: they are responsible for reference fixation, for cognitive 
significance, and coordination of information. Orlando proposes a  two-level 
semantics where the content of singular expressions is constituted jointly by 
referents and such modes of presentation. It follows from this approach that an 
utterance of (1) has to be interpreted as expressing a  two-level content 
composed by (1a) and (1b):
(1) Franzen is the author of The Corrections.
(1a) The singular proposition constituted by Franzen and the property of being 
the author of The Corrections.
(1b) The conceptual proposition constituted by the FRANZEN file and the 
descriptive concept ‘author of The Corrections’ contained in that file.
(1a) should be familiar, as it corresponds to the Russellian conception of 
singular propositions. This kind of content can be evaluated with respect to 
truth and falsity. If Franzen possesses the property of being the author of The 
Corrections, (1a) is true. At first glance (1b) may seem superfluous, since 
Russellian propositions are commonly assumed to express complete sentential 
contents without the intervention of modes of presentation. Orlando 
maintains, however, that (1b) does not determine (1a), contrary to what 
Fregeans might think. Rather, (1b) should be taken as representing an 
autonomous level of content. It is a mental or conceptual content that can be 
associated with the utterance of (1). And given that the FRANZEN file is a non-
descriptive mode of presentation of Franzen, the conceptual proposition (1b) is 
not general but singular.
The mental file framework supplemented with the above two-level semantics 
can also be successfully applied to fiction – at least Orlando says so. The first 
important thing to note in this regard is that one can differentiate between 
three types of utterance in fictional narratives. As many have pointed out, 
there are fictive, parafictive, and metafictive utterances of sentences that differ 
sharply from each other with respect to their contextual background.4
Consider the following examples. The first token occurrence of the character 
name type ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in Conan Doyle’s  oeuvre is to be found in his 
novel A Study in Scarlet, page 3, line 21:
(2) “You don’t know Sherlock Holmes yet”.
Since (2) is extracted from the text of the novel, it counts as a fictive utterance. 
Now compare (2) with (3):
(3) Sherlock Holmes was complemented perfectly by Dr. Watson.
(3) can be classified as a  parafictive utterance.5 One characteristic feature of 
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6 Fictive uses of character names still pose a problem for realists since tokens of ‘Holmes’ and 
‘Dr. Watson’ do not refer to possibilia or abstracta or … in Conan Doyle’s narrative. Therefore, 
realists usually argue that character names are empty in their fictive uses but parafictive and 
metafictive uses can refer back to characters that are already present at the primary textual 
level of the narrative. On this see, for example, Thomasson (2010).
this type of utterance is that it is based on two narrative perspectives: (3) 
concerns the internal textual content of Conan Doyle’s  narrative but it 
paraphrases or restates this content from an external perspective. Metafictive 
utterances, in contrast, presuppose only a single perspective, a perspective that 
is external to the narrative.
(4) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character.
In Conan Doyle’s  novel, Holmes is a  detective, not a  fictional character. But 
seen from the external perspective of literary criticism, Holmes is a  fictional 
character. Accordingly, (4) counts as a paradigmatic metafictive utterance.
Intuitively, all of these utterances are meaningful and true either in the 
internal context of the novel A Study in Scarlet or outside of it. The observation 
that Sherlock Holmes and Dr.  Watson are not real persons goes against this 
intuition, however. For if there are actually no such persons, then ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ and ‘Dr.  Watson’ are empty names, and thus utterances of such 
sentences as (2), (3), and (4) cannot express any proposition, which makes it 
hard to evaluate them as true.
This is a  well-known problem that has been tackled by two main types of 
approach over the last decades. Realists argue that although Sherlock Holmes 
and Dr. Watson are not real persons, the Holmes character and the Dr. Watson 
character exist. Different brands of realism have elaborated different views on 
the nature of characters. Some conceive fictional characters as existing 
possibilia, others maintain that Holmes and Dr.  Watson are created abstract 
objects and they are occasionally identified also with person-kinds existing in 
the same way as Platonic eternal idealities. What is common to all of these 
views is that they introduce an ontologically novel type of object for solving 
the above problem. If characters can be identified with possibilia, abstracta, or 
other types of objects, then character names can be taken to refer to these 
denizens of the world.6 On this basis, realists can safely claim that utterances 
of (2), (3), and (4) express propositions, and are therefore true, as our intuition 
suggests.
In contrast,antirealists argue that fictional characters do  not exist, and thus 
‘Sherlock Holmes’, ‘Dr.  Watson’ and other character names are empty. What 
justifies our intuition that utterances of (2), (3), and (4) are true is that by 
reading Conan Doyle’s narrative readers imagine or assume that there are such 
persons as Holmes and Dr.  Watson. This does not mean that utterances 
involving character names express singular propositions and are literally true. 
Such utterances are understood through an implicit paraphrase which typically 
takes the following form: according to an imaginative game authorized by the 
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The main difficulty for this view is that metafictive utterances cannot be interpreted as 
belonging to authorized make-believe games. Antirealists claim, therefore, that utterances 
like ‘Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character’ should be seen as unauthorized make-believe 
games or betrayals of authorized make-believe games.
8 Here, I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out a flaw in an earlier draft 
of this paper.
novel A  Study in Scarlet, such-and-such is the case.7 Paraphrased in this way, 
fictional utterances express general propositions about the imaginative game 
rather than singular propositions about the characters of the narrative. What is 
said about Holmes and Dr. Watson is thus merely imaginatively true.
Orlando rightly observes that this situation confronts us with a dilemma. One 
option is that we interpret utterances like (2), (3), and (4) as expressing 
singular propositions about fictional characters at the cost of adopting 
a controversial ontology of objects. The other option is that we take (2), (3), and 
(4) to be parts of imaginative games at the cost of losing their capacity to 
express propositions about particular individuals. (see Orlando, 2017, p. 62)
Orlando’s  main contention is that the mental file framework sketched above 
enables us to avoid this dilemma. By adopting thisframework we can defend 
the antirealist theory of fictional characters and at the same time claim that 
utterances involving character names express singular propositions. The 
reasoning goes as follows. First, we should recognize that character names can 
be accounted for by the same two-level semantics as ordinary proper names. If 
‘Jonathan Franzen’ has a  referent (i.e. the person Franzen) and may be 
associated with a mode of presentation (i.e. the FRANZEN file), then ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ should possess an identical or analogous set of semantic properties. 
The difference is, of course, that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ cannot be used to refer to 
the person Holmes since there is no such person. But then the supposed 
analogy between ‘Franzen’ and ‘Holmes’ disappears. Thus the second step in 
the reasoning consists of showing that the character name ‘Holmes’ should be 
taken to refer not to its customary referent (since there is no such thing) but to 
its mode of presentation (i.e. the HOLMES file). This amounts to showing that 
‘Holmes’ is not empty even on the referential level of content. How can this be 
done? According to Orlando, utterances involving character names are not 
about the real external world. When readers talk about the protagonist of the 
novel A  Study in Scarlet, they talk about something that has been created by 
Conan Doyle’s fantasy. And it seems quite correct to assume that the products 
of the author’s fantasy belong to the conceptual realm.
So when readers talk about the deeds and attributes of Holmes, they talk in fact 
about the conceptual content of the novel that was tokened first in Conan 
Doyle’s  mind. They can succeed in this only when they have a  referential 
intention which is directed to this conceptual content. That is to say, by using 
the character name ‘Holmes’ readers of the novel must have the intention to 
refer obliquely to the mode of presentation of Holmes. The idea of oblique 
reference, of course, goes back to Frege, who once assumed that when referring 
expressions occur in the scope of an epistemic attitude verb like ‘believe’, 
theyrefer to their customary senses, not to their customary referents.8
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In the case of a fictive utterance with a character name referential obliqueness 
means that a particular descriptive concept must be ascribed to a mental file. 
So  ‘Holmes’ refers to the HOLMES file in (2) and the file is ascribed the 
descriptive concept ‘is yet unknown to someone’. Since (2) is part of Conan 
Doyle’s original novel, it can be taken to express this content automatically in 
the conceptual world of the narrative of that novel. Therefore, (2) comes out as 
true.
The parafictive utterance (3) requires a slightly different treatment because the 
descriptive concept ‘was complemented perfectly by Dr. Watson’ is not ascribed 
to the HOLMES file in the conceptual world of Conan Doyle’s original narrative. 
If we want to find out whether or not (3) is true, we should analyse the 
narrative from an external perspective. It may turn out, after reading the novel, 
that Holmes and Dr.  Watson have been portrayed by Conan Doyle as having 
a  lot of complementary personal traits. If this is indeed the case, (3) accords 
with the conceptual content of the narrative. On this basis, (3) can also be 
judged as true.
The metafictive utterance (4) expresses a conceptual content that consists of the 
HOLMES file and the descriptive concept ‘is a fictional character’. As in the case 
of (3), the descriptive concept is not part of the conceptual world of the original 
narrative. Moreover, ‘is a fictional character’ is a kind of content that is entirely 
incompatible with the internal perspective of the novel A Study in Scarlet. But 
approached from the external perspective of a reader who wants to talk about 
the ontological status of the character, (4) appears to be an ordinary, 
meaningful utterance. Orlando argues that this metafictive utterance can be 
accounted for by a  hybrid interpretation. On the one hand, the utterer of (4) 
obliquely refers to the mode of presentation of Holmes. On the other hand, she 
ascribes a descriptive concept to the HOLMES file that does not accord with the 
conceptual content of the narrative. In other words, in this case, the referential 
shift is only partial: while the character name ‘Holmes’ changes its referent 
and refers to its mode of presentation, the predicate ‘is a  fictional character’ 
retains its default semantic function and denotes the worldly property ‘being 
a  fictional character’. Thanks to this hybrid structure, (4) is partly about the 
conceptual world of the narrative and partly about the non-fictional world. 
That is why utterances of (4) can be interpreted as expressing true singular 
propositions.
3 Theory-Internal Problems
As we have seen above, Orlando’s  arguments are general enough to provide 
a satisfactory mental file framework for fiction. One noteworthy feature of the 
framework is that it can be applied to all types of fictional utterances. 
Unfortunately, despite its generality and applicability, the framework suffers 
from three systematic objections. Perhaps one of them may be reassuringly 
answered, but the other two seem to be troubling. Let’s begin our survey with 
the weakest objection.
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9 It is worth noting that whether directing intentions are part of the semantic of 
demonstratives or belong to presemantics or pragmatics is a subject of debate.
Objection one: referential shift cannot be elicited by intention alone. Orlando 
claims that a  character name like ‘Holmes’ “seems not to refer to 
anybody.” (Orlando, 2017, p. 66) I  guess the “seems not to refer” here is only 
a polite way of saying that ‘Holmes’ is an empty singular expression. ‘Holmes’ 
lacks a  referent because there is no real detective who lives at 221B Baker 
Street, London, smokes the pipe, etc. Of course, readers who participate in an 
authorised imaginative game use ‘Holmes’ as if it were an ordinary referring 
name. But it is important to note that imaginative games are unable to alter 
the semantic profile of names. If a name has been introduced into a narrative 
as an empty expression, it remains empty even if it is used within an 
imaginative game for referring to a  person. ‘Holmes’ can be taken to refer to 
a detective in an imaginative game not because the imaginative game endows 
it with a  referential capacity but because it is used in that game as if it were 
a referring name. In light of this, we can contend that referential emptiness is 
a constant semantic property of character names.
The mental file framework suggests otherwise. It is claimed that character 
names undergo a  semantic shift and refer to mental files in all of their uses. 
After the shift has taken place, ‘Holmes’ ceases to be empty and starts to refer 
(obliquely) to the HOLMES file. The change in the semantic profile of the 
character name is supposed to be elicited by a  specific sort of intention. 
Orlando calls this intention ‘simulative’.
I  find this picture rather implausible. My objection is not that this type of 
referential shift is in principle impossible. Indexicals and demonstratives refer 
via the intentions of speakers. So  the content of an indexical expression or 
a demonstrative can be shifted by the referential intention of the speaker. This 
may happen even within an utterance of a  single sentence. For illustration, 
consider a  now-classic example of unbound pronouns from 
Kaplan’s  Afterthoughts: “You, you, you, and you can leave, but you stay.” On 
Kaplan’s  view, it is the directing intention of the speaker that distinguishes 
between the referents of the token occurrences of ‘you’. (see Kaplan, 1989, 
p. 589)9 My objection is that the referents of character names cannot be shifted 
in this way. There is ample textual evidence that character names like ‘Holmes’ 
attempt to refer to persons. Although they do not succeed in this attempt, they 
are not sensitive to the changes of contextual factors like indexicals which 
have a  two-dimensional (character/content) semantic structure. To repeat, 
readers of Conan Doyle’s  narrative may have a  specific sort of intention to 
use‘Holmes’ for referring to a  mental file or a  mental representation but this 
will not yield the result that it in fact refers to a  mental file or a  mental 
representation.
One possible rejoinder to this objection is to point out that character names 
and other singular expressions are introduced into fictional narratives by 
simulative intentions. To adopt such a  view would be tantamount to saying 
that character names refer to mental files from the very beginning of their 
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10 A reviewer asks why we should take for granted that the first token of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ seems 
to refer to a person. According to the reviewer, this is counterintuitive since both the author 
and the readers know for a fact that there is no real person that is Sherlock Holmes. In 
response, I would say that it is better to keep the distinction between ‘seemings’ and ‘facts’: 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ seems to refer to a person because it behaves in its first occurrence in 
Conan Doyle’s text as an ordinary personal name. What the author and the readers know 
about the existence/nonexistence of the character is, in my view, an independent issue.
career. Perhaps the first token occurrence of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in the novel 
A  Study in Scarlet refers already to a  mental representation. Although this 
token occurrence seems to refer to a  person within its host sentence, this is 
only a surface semantic effect.10 Actually, Conan Doyle introduced the name of 
his protagonist to refer to its mode of presentation (i.e. the HOLMES file). 
So  the argument may go. This would be a  more plausible explanation for the 
alleged referential shift in the semantic profile of the name. If it is correct to 
assume that the profile of names depends, at least in part, on the semantically 
relevant aspects of their introduction, for example, in the semantic or 
communicative intentions of their introducers,thenit can be imagined that 
instances of a  certain kind of name are designed so  that they referto 
mentalobjects. The question is whether authors of fictional works introduce 
character names into their narratives in this manner. Regretfully, a  definitive 
answer would require a  lengthy excursion into the cognitive/psychological 
theory of artistic creation, which is beyond the scope of this paper. So  let us 
leave this question open and turn instead to the second objection.
Objection two: character names are supposed to perform two conflicting functions 
in fictional narratives. As has already been mentioned, Orlando takes character 
names to refer to mental files. The character name ‘Holmes’ is supposed to 
refer to the HOLMES file, ‘Dr. Watson’ is supposed to refer to the DR WATSON 
file, and so forth. On hearing this, one may ask not only ‘what is the function of 
mental files?’, but also ‘what type of object are they?’. Orlando says that, from 
an ontological point of view, mental files are mental particulars. This does not 
clarify, however, whether they are concrete or abstract objects. Early advocates 
of the mental file theory like John Perry and Jerry Fodor have argued that files 
are objects in the mind or objects that are instantiated in the mind. These 
objects were conceived of as having causes and effects in the physical world. 
(see Fodor, 1990, pp. 23–25; Perry, 1980, p. 330) From this, it obviously follows 
that mental files were identified by these authors with concrete particulars. In 
a  footnote, Orlando says that her own approach shares the ontological 
commitments of Fodor’s early work on mental representation. We may assume, 
then, that she would answer the question ‘what type of object are mental files?’ 
by saying that they are concrete particulars. If my reconstruction is correct, 
character names are supposed to refer ultimately to concrete objects in 
Orlando’s framework.
But this is, so to speak, only one aspect of the framework. The other aspect is 
that character names are supposed to refer to or stand for something abstract. 
The reason for this is the following. As already mentioned, according to 
Orlando, utterances of sentences like (2), (3), and (4) have to be interpreted 
as  being about “something that has been created by an author’s 
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this conception, reference is per definitionem a relation to an “external” object. So it can be 
said that ‘Holmes’ stands for an abstractum, but it is incorrect to say that ‘Holmes’ refers to an 
abstractum. Not everyone shares this view. A well-known exception is to construe the relation 
of reference on the basis of negative free logic (Sainsbury 2005), which allows reference 
without referents. But there are also other alternatives. For example, Burge (2010) and Davies 
(2019) argue for a non-relational way of referring that can be successfully applied to abstract 
objects. Unfortunately, Orlando’s framework does not take into consideration these 
developments.
imagination.” (Orlando, 2017, p. 67) And the products of authorial imagination 
– fictional works and the characters portrayed in these works – must be seen as 
belonging to the realm of abstracta. This means that fictional works and 
fictional characters are not part of the physical world. Rather, they are identical 
with or part of the conceptual world that has been created by an 
author’s artistic activity.
By applying this line of reasoning to the case of Holmes we get the following 
result. The main character of the novel A  Study in Scarlet is the product of 
Conan Doyle’s  authorial imagination. The character is part of the conceptual 
world of the novel, from which it follows that it is an abstract object of some 
sort. Therefore, when the character is the subject matter of our utterances, 
token occurrences of ‘Holmes’ may be taken to refer to or stand for a  certain 
abstract object.11 In Orlando’s  own words: “our referential intention in using 
a  fictional name can be construed as being oriented towards something not 
real (in the sense of belonging in the external world) but purely 
conceptual.” (Orlando, 2017, p. 67)
The problem is that these two aspects of the framework are in conflict with 
each other. On the one hand, there is a  semantic relation between the 
character name ‘Holmes’ and the HOLMES file. On the other, there is 
a semantic relation that relates ‘Holmes’ to the Holmes character. And this is 
something that cannot be integrated into a coherent semantic picture because 
‘Holmes’ is related at once both to a concrete particular (i.e. HOLMES file) and 
to an abstract object. (i.e. the Holmes character)
Objection three: the mental file framework is incompatible with the antirealist view 
of fictional objects. There is a  sharp disagreement between realists and 
antirealists on whether fictional objects exist. Realists believe that fictional 
objects are part of the overall inventory of what there is. This is not an 
innocent position because existing objects are typically thought of as being 
accessible through direct or indirect sensory experience; and it is fairly clear 
that Holmes, Dr.  Watson, and their likes are not perceptible existents. 
Advocates of the realist view argue, therefore, that fictional objects are to be 
identified with a  certain non-standard type of object. The most popular 
candidates are possibilia, created abstracta, and Platonic idealities. Fictional 
utterances are then interpreted as involving one of these types of non-
standard objects. This ontological move saves the intuition that fictional 
utterances express singular propositions that can be either true or false. In 
contrast, antirealists are deeply convinced that our world does not contain any 
fictional objects. Fictional utterances appear to commit us to these objects but 
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12 For an overview of this issue, see McGinn (1980).
13 The first systematic elaboration of the artefactualist position is to be found in Thomasson 
(1999). For a new version of the artefactualist view, see Vecsey (2019).
from the antirealist’s  point of view, this is what it is: an appearance. We are 
willing to accept the existence of these objects because we entertain the 
utterances of fictional narratives by participating in authorised imaginative 
games. Accordingly, fictional utterances are to be taken to express true 
propositions about persons like Holmes or Dr. Watson only in an imaginative 
sense.
Orlando’s  mental file framework was designed to demonstrate that the 
antirealist theory of fictional objects can be reconciled with the claim that 
fictional utterances express propositions that are not imaginatively true, but 
instead true in the real world. But the framework cannot fulfill this promise.
There are at least two reasons for this. First, Orlando rejected the realist 
approach to fictional objects on the grounds that it embraces a non-standard 
ontology. One would expect, then, that her own approach is based on 
a  standard ontological theory. Can mental files (i.e. concrete mental 
particulars) be incorporated into a  standard classification scheme of objects? 
Although Orlando and other followers of Perry and Fodor find it self-evident 
that mental files constitute a natural kind, ontologists disagree with them on 
this point. The classificatory difficulty arises from the fact that mental objects 
of this type are “hybrid” existents, which satisfy the standard criteria both of 
concreteness and abstractness.12 So  it is not quite correct to suggest that the 
antirealist view of fiction can readily be paired with the mental file framework 
because both have equally parsimonious ontological commitments.
Second, and more importantly, it can be pointed out that the central claims of 
the mental file framework are incompatible with the antirealist view. While 
Walton (1990), Everett (2013), and other antirealists argue forcefully against 
the existence of fictional characters, Orlando seems to take an opposite view. 
She contends that if readers want to talk about the protagonist of a  fictional 
work, then their referential intention is directed to something that belongs to 
the conceptual/abstract realm. And, on her view, this conceptual/abstract 
something exists contingently: it comes into being through an 
author’s  storytelling activity. But this is precisely what certain advocates of 
fictional realism claim. Artefactualists can happily accept that the protagonists 
of fictional works do  indeed exist and that they can be classified as abstract 
objects.13 Artefactualists can also agree with the claim that objects of fictional 
narratives like Holmes or Dr.  Watson exist only contingently. Their abstract 
nature does not exclude that they are created objects. Many other products of 
our cultural activity come into being in a  similar way: laws, institutions, 
marriages, etc., are paradigmatic abstract objects, but they do  not and could 
not exist without the intervention of human intentional activity. This indicates 
rather clearly, I  think, that Orlando’s mental file framework is much closer to 
the artefactualists’ position than it is to the antirealist view.
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4 Mental Files from the Perspective of Fictional Realism
In the previous section, I  pointed out that when we apply the mental file 
framework to the theory of fictional objects in a way similar to Orlando’s, then 
the result will suffer from various theory-internal problems. A minor problem 
is that the framework assumes that the semantic profile of character names 
can be modified deliberately. Perhaps when authors introduce the names of 
their protagonists, they use these names from the outset as referring to 
something mental. Perhaps at least some of them use character names in this 
way. But this assumption needs empirical validation. Orlando’s  two-level 
semantics generates however a  more serious problem. According to this view, 
character names are related both to mental files thought of as concrete 
particulars and to characters conceived of as being abstract objects. It is hard to 
see how this tension might be resolved within the proposed framework.  It is 
also hard to see how the basic principles of the two-level semantics can be 
reconciled with the antirealist view which holds that there are no such things 
as fictional objects. The semantics has been so  constructed that it allows for 
character names to be used referentially. Clearly, antirealists cannot tolerate 
this semantic claim, since it entails that character names do have referents and 
this means, ontologically speaking, that there are fictional objects.
In this last section, I will discuss briefly a possible way out of this theoretical 
impasse. As we have seen, fictional antirealists are in a  difficult theoretical 
situation, because they have to reconcile two apparently incompatible theses. 
The first is a definitory claim. It says that it is a constitutive feature of mental 
files that they store and manage information/misinformation about objects. 
The second is the core ontological claim of the antirealist stance on fiction, 
which says that fictional objects do not belong to the overall inventory of what 
exists. The simplest and most often used antirealist strategy for reconciling 
these two claims is to adopt the Waltonian model of fiction and argue that 
fictional works should be conceived as prescriptions to imagine. Readers of 
fictional works have to imagine that things are in a  certain way, for example, 
that Sherlock Holmes is a detective who lives at 221B Baker Street, London. It 
can be said, then, that although there are no fictional objects in reality, such 
objects feature in our imaginative acts and states. When readers collect and 
store information/misinformation about the protagonists of fictional works, 
their attention is directed to what should be imagined about these 
protagonists (i.e. the informational content of their own imaginatory acts and 
states). According to the resulting view, there is no obstacle to open mental 
files about merely imagined objects: even though Holmes lacks real existence, 
readers take it for granted, based on what they imagine, that “he” is an existing 
person.14 In the end, files about spatiotemporal objects are supposed to differ 
from files about fictional objects only with respect to their type of reference. 
While reference is acquaintance-based in the first case, it is merely imagined in 
the second case.
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Despite its prima facie plausibility, I  do  not consider the antirealist’s 
explanatory strategy to be successful. The reason for skepticism is rooted in the 
very starting point of that strategy. In particular, it seems misleading to say 
that mental file theory in itself requires reconciling incompatible theses about 
fiction. I do not want to reject the definitory claim according to which mental 
files store and manage information/misinformation about objects. But 
I do think that the antirealist’s ontological claim can be rejected, at least from 
the perspective of our everyday literary practices.
The question is whether we have access to the informational contents of 
literary works (i.e. literary texts) in the way antirealists assume. Is it really 
correct to say that imagination is our most direct and privileged epistemic 
relation to the textual level of works? I think the adequacy of the imagination-
based conception is bounded by a more fundamental epistemic constraint: in 
order to imagine that a  particular object o  is so-and-so, we must already be 
acquainted with the text of a literary work which represents o linguistically as 
being so-and-so. This precondition may justly be thought of as a  strong 
constraint because it narrows down the possible ways in which we may come to 
know of o to those that involve our language-based capacities. We simply need 
to read and process the relevant passages where o and its distinctive properties 
are portrayed. Imagination can only be activated after these passages have 
already been understood. 
One might object that the epistemic priority argument does not undermine the 
antirealists’ position because they may still argue that, even though our access 
to the contents of literary works must be mediated by language, fictional 
persons and events exist only in imagination. But the epistemic priority 
argument is more powerful than antirealists may think it is because it has an 
ontological consequence. If the text of a literary work represents o as being so-
and-so, and our primary access to o is mediated by language, then our thought 
and talk about o should be taken as ontologically committing. By thinking and 
saying that Holmes is a detective we are committed to those representations, 
be they structurally simple or complex, that have the content or convey the 
information that Holmes is a detective.
A fictional realist who follows this line of thought may add that there is nothing 
more to being Holmes than being the content of these representations. The 
realist’s general ontological point is that each fictional person can be identified 
with a specific set of representations. More precisely, the claim is that fictional 
persons have to be considered as embodiments of sets of interdependent and 
interconnected linguistic representations. ‘Embodiment’ stands here for 
a mental operation which binds separate but related representational elements 
into particular unities. We readers perform this operation rather easily when 
reading different passages of literary works. It does not take much reflection to 
recognize that scattered property descriptions like is a  detective, is a  pipe-
smoker, or lives at 221B Baker Street, London belong to the same set of Holmes-
representations in Conan Doyle’s  detective novel, A  Study in Scarlet. The 
effective working of this operation is based, at least partly, on the fact that 
property descriptions of this type are capable of conveying informational 
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content. We understand perfectly well what it means to say that someone lives 
at 221B Baker Street, London. We understand this, even though the property 
description lives at 221B Baker Street, London lacks a  language-external 
representatum.15 Fictional realists may add, again, that this holds for 
informational contents in general: linguistic structures which are 
representation apt in literary works represent their target objects without 
being related to the language-external world. 
In this regard, realists may rely on a conceptual distinction which was initially 
stated by Nelson Goodman (1968). In analysing the issues of pictorial 
representation, Goodman argued that ‘represent’ may occasionally be taken as 
an unbreakable one-place predicate. Many artistic pictures represent existing 
objects, Goodman says, but there are also pictures that do  not represent 
anything. A  picture of a  unicorn is one of these cases. Yet to say this sounds 
a  bit paradoxical. What could it mean that a  picture does not represent 
anything and yet is a picture of a unicorn? If ‘represent’ has to be interpreted 
as a two-place predicate with an argument place for objects, then the paradox 
cannot be resolved. We ought to talk about a  particular object and attribute 
properties to it when we want to talk about a  representation. A way out is to 
recognise that a  picture representing a  unicorn is aunicorn-representing-
picture, or, for short, a  unicorn-picture, not a  picture of or about a  unicorn. 
This helps mitigate the paradoxical effects of the statement that although 
there are no unicorns, there are pictures that represent them. Although 
Goodman’s  main target was the problem of nonexistence in pictorial 
representations and he was obviously not a  realist with respect to the 
ontological status of fictional creatures such as unicorns, his conceptual 
innovation seems to be easily transferable to the linguistic domain. The crucial 
point lies in the following distinction: non-fictional representations are 
normally representations of objects, where ‘represent’ should be interpreted as 
a  two-place predicate; in contrast, fictional representations are object-
representations, where ‘represent’ should be interpreted as a  one-place 
predicate. Thus, while the former have a world-relational structure, the latter 
are thoroughly non-relational.
Coming back for the last time to Conan Doyle’s main protagonist, it is essential 
to understand the order of explanation that is characteristic of the above-
sketched approach. First, the epistemic priority argument states that our 
primary access to Holmes is mediated by language. We do not have, and cannot 
have, any language-independent knowledge about this fictional character: 
there are simply no exclusively perceptual means for recognising and 
identifying “him”. Second, in reading Conan Doyle’s  novel we come to know 
that the text represents Holmes in a great variety of ways. More accurately, we 
come to know that the text contains a  large number of property descriptions 
that have a  common feature: all of these descriptions provide some partial 
information about one and the same protagonist. On that basis, we unify the 
descriptions under the label ‘Sherlock Holmes’, and then identify the character 
with this representational unity. In other words, we recognise that Holmes 
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embodies this representational unity. And third, relying on the Goodmanian 
distinction between the contrasting types of representation, weassociate with 
the character the semantic property of non-relationality. That is, we regard the 
unified and embodied property descriptions as providing us with a  Holmes-
representation, instead of a  representation of Holmes. In this way, we can 
emphasize that in order to understand the mode of operation of the character 
name ‘Holmes’ there is no need to relationally refer to the facts and state of 
affairs of the language-external world.
The overall picture that arises from these short observations offer us three 
important lessons for the present context: (i) the imagination-first based 
approach to the problem of fictional objects is not mandatory; (ii) contrary to 
the antirealist doctrine, fictional objects do  exist; and (iii) by applying the 
notion of non-relational representation, one can save the intuition concerning 
the informativity and understandability of literary texts. If this picture is 
correct, as I  think it is, then realists can explain the possible connection 
between the theory of fictional objects and the mental file framework more 
easily than antirealists do. 
Given that realists acknowledge the real, not only imagined existence of 
fictional objects, they can make use of the notion of mental file to provide an 
explication of how we store and manage information/misinformation about 
such objects, and this may be done in more than one way. They could argue, as 
above, that mental files have the function of binding together non-relational 
linguistic representations that readers gather from their reading experiences. 
(Vecsey, 2019) Alternatively, they may argue that fictional objects are created 
types and that readers refer to purported tokens of such types through mental 
files. (Terrone, 2017) Or they may claim, from the perspective of Discourse 
Representation Theory, that fictional objects are vicariously anchored entity 
representations that are stored in files. (Kamp, 2015) There are also other 
related options which take non-relationality as a property of purely intentional 
representations (Rey, 2003), or as a  property of concepts. (Sainsbury, 2018) 
Which of these options is the most appropriate for the mental file framework 
depends, of course, on further details of the realist’s  view, but an in-depth 
discussion of this issue would require another paper.
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